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OVERLOOKING CANON: HOW THE ALABAMA SUPREME 
COURT USED A FOOTNOTE TO DISREGARD TRIBAL 






The Poarch Band of Creek Indians—unsuccessfully—petitioned for a 
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court following an Alabama Supreme 
Court decision against it. In Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority,
1
 a decision 
proving disastrous for tribes across the country, the Alabama high court 
rejected the time-honored doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The 
court’s decision against the Poarch Band of Creek Indians defies Supreme 
Court precedent and congressional authority, both of which have, for well 
over a century, reinforced a tribe’s right to sovereign immunity in the 
absence of waiver. Further, the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision is a 
clear intrusion on federal law, an area in which state courts do not have the 
power to rule. Supreme Court precedent is clear; it is of upmost importance 
to examine it and consider the implications flowing from the Alabama 
court’s decision, not just for the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, but for all 
tribes. 
II. Law Before the Case 
In Wilkes, the Supreme Court of Alabama, like many courts throughout 
history, was asked to address the common law doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity. However, unlike previous courts, the Alabama Supreme Court 
reached a shocking conclusion by consciously rejecting precedent—holding 
that a tribe could be sued, despite the absence of congressional or tribal 
waiver. While the general premise behind the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity is simple—one cannot sue a sovereign government—the 
doctrine’s origin in common law renders its application significantly more 
nuanced. Rather than defining the contours and scope of tribal immunity 
with one specific piece of legislation, courts should defer to years of 
precedent when addressing a tribe’s immunity from suit. In order to 
                                                                                                             
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. No. 17-1175, 2017 WL 4385738 (Ala. Sept. 29, 2017). The case is known on appeal 
as Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Wilkes. See 139 S. Ct. 305 (2018) (mem.).  
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understand the scope of the issue, it is paramount to address how the 
Supreme Court has historically discerned the limits of tribal immunity. 
Although the Court’s relatively recent decisions in Kiowa Tribe of 
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.
2
 and Michigan v. Bay Mills 
Indian Community
3
 are most commonly cited, the concept of tribal 
sovereign immunity made its first appearance in Supreme Court precedent 
nearly two centuries ago. The first three cases, known as the Marshall 
Trilogy, began with Johnson v. M’Intosh
4
 in 1823, followed by Cherokee 
Nation v. Georgia
5
 in 1831, and Worcester v. Georgia
6
 a year later. Lastly, 
the 1919 landmark opinion Turner v. United States
7
 established tribal 
sovereign immunity as we know it today. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Johnson v. M’Intosh was the first time the 
Court established federal supremacy over tribes. Johnson, on its face, dealt 
with a property dispute involving land granted by the Illinois and 
Piankeshaw Indians.
8
 However, the primary takeaway is, in deciding that 
tribal lands could only be transferred to the federal government, the Court 
established that federal law governed the Tribe.
9
  
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Supreme Court characterized Indian 
tribes as “domestic dependent nations” that are not subject to state 
regulation but are rather “completely under the sovereignty and dominion 
of the United States.”
10
 This 1831 case thus equated tribes to a level of 
statehood. One year later, the Court reinforced the idea that tribes should be 
afforded status equal to that of states by holding, in Worcester v. Georgia, 
that “Indian territory [is] completely separated from that of the states,” and 
that any interaction with tribes is to be carried out solely by the federal 
government.
11
 The Court described tribes as distinct communities, holding 
their own territory and boundaries “in which the laws of [the state] can have 
no force.”
12
 States had no power over tribes or tribal lands because, as 
stated above, this power was explicitly reserved for the federal 
                                                                                                             
 2. 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
 3. 572 U.S. 782 (2014). 
 4. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).  
 5. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).  
 6. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 7. 248 U.S. 354 (1919).  
 8. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572.  
 9. Id. at 587. 
 10. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.  
 11. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 557. 
 12. Id. at 520. 
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 These two landmark cases illustrate early conversations 
regarding the federal government’s sole authority to govern tribal affairs. In 
essence, these cases laid the foundation for the Supreme Court to establish 
the borders between state rights and tribal sovereignty, carried out through 




While Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia are 
responsible for promulgating the “supremacy of the federal government 
[which] has been a staple of Indian affairs,”
15
 the notion of tribal sovereign 
immunity was brought to fruition in Turner v. United States. In Turner, 
individual members of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation were sued for tearing 
down a fence built on Indian lands by a ranching company that had Tribal 
authorization to build it.
16
 After the company failed to secure compensation 
from the Tribe, the federal government briefly seized control over the 
Tribe.
17
 With express authorization from Congress, the ranching company 
sued both the Tribe and “the United States as trustee of [the Tribe’s] 
funds.”
18
 The Supreme Court held, apart from receiving authorization from 
Congress or express tribal consent, a Tribe cannot be sued in any court.
19
 
Thus, though the ranching company did receive authorization from 
Congress to sue in this scenario, the essential takeaway is—for the first 
time—the Court makes clear that absent congressional authorization or 
tribal waiver, tribes retain their right to sovereign immunity.  
The Turner Court reasoned that tribes exercise sovereign powers because 
they have fully functioning governments, laws, and systems of checks and 
balances with executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
20
 One stone left 
unturned in Turner, which was later addressed in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma 
                                                                                                             
 13. Id. 
 14. Brief for Amicus Curiae United South & Eastern Tribes, Inc., in Support of 
Petitioners at 17, Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Wilkes, No. 17-1175 (U.S. Mar. 26, 
2018), https://sct.narf.org/documents/poarch_v_wilkes/cert_amicus_united_south_and_ 
eastern_tribes.pdf. 
 15. Brief of Indian Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 16, 
Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Wilkes, No. 17-1175 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://sct.narf.org/documents/poarch_v_wilkes/cert_amici_scholars.pdf [hereinafter Brief of 
Indian Law Scholars]. 
 16. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 357 (1919).  
 17. Brief of Indian Law Scholars, supra note 15, at 5. 
 18. Turner, 248 U.S. at 357; see also Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, § 26, 35 Stat. 444, 
457. 
 19. Turner, 248 U.S. at 358. 
 20. Id. at 355. 
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v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., was the applicability of tribal 
sovereign immunity to tort cases.
21
 Tort cases are distinct because of the 
possibility that an individual, without willingly entering into a relationship 
with a tribe, could develop a tort claim against a tribe. Because tribes hold 
sovereign immunity, the individual is left without a remedy under these 
circumstances. However, the Turner Court could not have reached its 
conclusion without explicitly recognizing tribal sovereign immunity.
22
 
Thus, Turner established that “Indian tribes are immune from all claims 




In 1986, the Supreme Court reinforced tribal sovereign immunity 
through Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold 
Engineering.
24
 This case further defined the broad scope of sovereign 
immunity that tribes enjoy and reinforced that tribal immunity is only 
subordinate to federal law or a tribe’s decision to waive it. In Three 
Affiliated Tribes, the tribes sued a nonmember for tort and contract claims 
in state court.
25
 The case followed a state court decision disallowing tribes 
from suing in state court unless they waived their tribal sovereign 
immunity.
26
 The Supreme Court reversed because it found the waiver 
requirement to be “unduly intrusive” on tribal common law sovereign 
immunity, as immunity “is a necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and 
self-governance.”
27
 The Court referenced the potentially disastrous 
declension of tribal governance which tribes would be subjected to by 




The court in Three Affiliated Tribes clarified that sovereign immunity is 
an issue of federal law: “[I]n the absence of federal authorization, tribal 
immunity, like all aspects of tribal sovereignty, is privileged from 
diminution by the States.”
29
 Further, because “any potential counterclaims 
involved in that matter would have sounded in tort,” Three Affiliated Tribes 
                                                                                                             
 21. See Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756–57 (1998). 
 22. Brief of Indian Law Scholars, supra note 15, at 6.  
 23. Id. 
 24. 476 U.S. 877 (1986). 
 25. Id. at 878. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 890–91. 
 28. Id. at 891.  
 29. Id.  
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recognized that tribes are immune—even in the case of a tort—in any case 
without the tribe’s consent or congressional approval.
30
 
The common law doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity has continually 
resurfaced in recent cases. The Supreme Court, however, has remained 
vigilant in upholding tribal immunity, be it “on or off reservation, in a 
governmental or a commercial context, in contract or tort.”
31
 This was seen 
in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.,
32
 where 




Although Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. 
was based on a contract claim, the Court used the case to address tribal 
sovereignty with respect to the unique nature of tort claims—specifically 
considering scenarios where tribal sovereign immunity has the ability to 
injure individuals unaware of tribal immunity and situations where an 
individual did not choose to deal with a tribe, as seen in tort cases.
34
 The 
Court recognized the potential dangers that can accompany sovereign 
immunity, but the holding clearly emphasizes that sovereign immunity 
extends to tribes in tort cases. This case is a prime example of the 
importance the Supreme Court has placed on the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity. Even in the face of adverse consequences, the Court 
defends tribal immunity and shows steadfast deference to legislative action.  
The Kiowa Court emphasized that the subject and legality of tribal 
immunity should be considered by Congress, not by courts.
35
 The Court 
echoed the Three Affiliated Tribes decision to fully uphold sovereign 
immunity unless Congress allows the suit or the tribe waives its 
immunity.
36
 The Supreme Court explicitly chose to follow prior precedent, 
completely deferring to Congress, believing in Congress’s wisdom and 
ability to limit tribal sovereign immunity through legislative action.
37
 Thus, 
because Congress has yet to say otherwise, the Court, once again, ruled that 
sovereign immunity governed.
38
 In addition to upholding tribal immunity, 
                                                                                                             
 30. Brief of Indian Law Scholars, supra note 15, at 7. 
 31. Id.  
 32. 523 U.S. 751 (1998). 
 33. Id. at 760. 
 34. Id. at 758. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 754. 
 37. Id. at 752. 
 38. Id. at 760–61.  
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Kiowa also reiterated that sovereign immunity “is a matter of federal law 
and is not subject to diminution by the States.”
39
  
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiowa, Congress considered 
two bills that attempted to bring clarity to tribal immunity from tort claims. 
The first, the American Indian Tort Liability Insurance Act, explored the 
option of giving federal courts jurisdiction over tort actions, and by doing 
so, waiving tribal immunity.
40
 The second, the American Indian Equal 
Justice Act, proposed waiving tribal sovereign immunity on tort cases, 
while giving both federal and state courts jurisdiction to preside over 
tribes.
41
 This Act was intended to equate tribal liability to that which non-
sovereign individuals and entities hold.
42
 Congress held extensive hearings 
on both of these bills.
43
 It is paramount to recognize that both of these bills 
would have waived tribal sovereign immunity, and both of these bills 
ultimately failed.
44
 The failing of both bills seemingly signifies that 
Congress does not wish to detract from tribal sovereign immunity. 
The conversation about sovereign immunity did not end with Kiowa. The 
Supreme Court addressed tribal sovereign immunity again in Michigan v. 
Bay Mills Indian Community,
45
 which involved an alleged breach of a 
gaming compact between the Tribe and the State of Michigan.
46
 The 
compact allowed the Tribe to operate a casino on tribal land within 
Michigan but prohibited the Tribe from doing so elsewhere.
47
 Bay Mills 
subsequently opened a second casino on property “purchased through a 
congressionally established land trust,” with the belief that it qualified as 
tribal land.
48
 Michigan did not agree, and the State accordingly sued Bay 
Mills under a statute allowing a state to enjoin gaming activity located on 
Indian lands when it violates a tribal-state compact.
49
  
Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the Sixth Circuit found the 
Michigan suit barred by tribal sovereign immunity, noting Congress has 
                                                                                                             
 39. Id. at 756. 
 40. See S. 2302, 105th Cong. (1998), discussed in Brief of Indian Law Scholars, supra 
note 15, at 12–13. 
 41. See S. 1691, 105th Cong. (1998), discussed in Brief of Indian Law Scholars, supra 
note 15, at 12–13. 
 42. Brief of Indian Law Scholars, supra note 15, at 12–13.  
 43. Id. at 13.  
 44. Id. 
 45. 572 U.S. 782 (2014). 
 46. Id. at 787. 
 47. Id. at 786. 
 48. Id. at 782. 
 49. Id. at 786–87. 
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neither passed legislation nor provided Michigan a waiver to file suit.
50
 
Importantly, the statute “only authorized suits to enjoin gaming activity 
located ‘on Indian lands,’” and Michigan’s primary contention was that the 
land in question was outside of tribal territory.
51
 On certiorari, the Supreme 
Court held Michigan’s suit was barred by tribal sovereign immunity.
52
 Once 
again, this decision echoes a promise of deference to legislation. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly deferred to congressional authority on 
the issue of tribal sovereign immunity because of tribes’ unique status as 
nations within, yet apart, from the United States. Thus, the judiciary tends 
to resist any decision which could jeopardize the centuries-old protected 
status of tribes. In reaching its decision in Bay Mills, the Supreme Court 
cited its long history in upholding tribal sovereign immunity. Justice Kagan, 
writing for the Court, termed Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations” 
who exercise intrinsic sovereign authority,
53
 while also, because of their 
dependent status, fall under the plenary power of Congress.
54
 Justice Kagan 
emphasized that Indian tribes remain “separate sovereigns pre-existing the 
Constitution,”
55
 concluding that “unless and ‘until Congress acts, [tribes] 
retain’ their historic sovereign authority.”
56
 Justice Kagan further stressed 
that tribal sovereign immunity, despite the amount of times it has come 




The Supreme Court in Bay Mills also referenced steps Congress took 
following its decision in Kiowa.
58
 While Congress directly referenced 
Kiowa and considered abrogating tribal immunity in regard to most torts, 
they ultimately decided against it, taking a decidedly less intrusive 
approach, instead “requiring tribes either to disclose or to waive their 
                                                                                                             
 50. Id. at 787.  
 51. Id. at 782. 
 52. Id. at 785.  
 53. Id. at 788. 
 54. Id.; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004) (“Congress, with this 
Court’s approval, has interpreted the Constitution’s ‘plenary’ grants of power as authorizing 
it to enact legislation that both restricts and, in turn, relaxes those restrictions on tribal 
sovereign authority.”).  
 55. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788 (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 
(1978)). 
 56. Id. (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)). 
 57. Id. at 789 (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 
(1998)). 
 58. Id. at 794. 
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immunity in contracts needing the Secretary of the Interior’s approval.”
59
 
The Bay Mills Court concluded by emphasizing that “it is fundamentally 
Congress’s job, not ours, to determine whether or how to limit tribal 
immunity.”
60
 The Supreme Court’s ruling in Bay Mills illustrates current 
precedent regarding the common law doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.  
This legal background brings us to the present case—Wilkes v. PCI 
Gaming Authority. In Wilkes, Respondents Casey Wilkes and Alexander 
Russell
61
 rely on an argument hinging on footnote 8 of the majority opinion 
in Bay Mills.
62
 Footnote 8 highlights that the Supreme Court has never 
addressed “whether immunity should apply in the ordinary way if a tort 
victim, or other plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe, has no 
alternative way to obtain relief for off-reservation commercial conduct.”
63
 
Although this footnote initiates a fervent conversation between the parties, 
its status as a footnote falls short to undermine the Bay Mills majority’s 
precedential value. Although insignificant compared to the multitudes of 
tribal sovereignty precedent, this lone footnote has resulted in the State of 
Alabama abandoning years of consistent Supreme Court precedent to reach 
a surprising outcome.  
III. Statement of the Case 
The Supreme Court of Alabama sent ripples through the legal 
community via its decision in Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority.
64
 The 
Alabama court, tasked with answering the question of whether an Indian 
tribe is immune from civil liability for tort claims asserted by non-members, 
abrogated the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Chief Justice Stuart, in 
his opinion, explained that because the Supreme Court has acknowledged it 
has never applied sovereign immunity “in a situation such as this,” the 
Alabama court will not extend the doctrine “beyond the circumstances to 
which that Court itself has applied it.”
65
 Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court 
held “that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity affords the tribal 
defendants no protection from the claims asserted by Wilkes and Russell.”
66
  
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. at 802.  
 60. Id. at 800.  
 61. Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Auth., No. 17-1175, 2017 WL 4385738, at *3 (Ala. Sept. 29, 
2017).  
 62. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 799 n.8. 
 63. Id. 
 64. No. 17-1175, 2017 WL 4385738.  
 65. Id. at *4.  
 66. Id. 
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Petitioners, the Poarch Band of Creek Indians, employed Barbie 
Spraggins, who worked at the Tribe’s Wind Creek-Wetumpka gaming 
facility.
67
 Spraggins worked as a facilities manager at the casino and hotel 
for over a year prior to the incident provoking this case.
68
 During her 
employment, Spraggins continually struggled with alcohol abuse during 
work hours.
69
 There were at least six times that Spraggins’ supervisor 
reported her for smelling like alcohol at work.
70
 Spraggins blood-alcohol 
content was tested multiple times while at work, with a test in February of 
2014 revealing a blood-alcohol content of .078.
71
 Following this test, 
Spraggins enrolled in an employee assistance program, which included 
sessions with a counselor; she attended this program for nearly half a year.
72
 
Only four months after completing the employee assistance program, 
Spraggins crashed into Casey Wilkes and Alexander Russell on the Mortar 
Creek Bridge, triggering the Wilkes litigation.
73
 On the day of the collision, 
Spraggins arrived to work at 8:00 a.m. after a heavy night of drinking.
74
 
Within three hours after arriving, Spraggins decided to leave work and go 
to a Wind Creek-Wetumpka maintained warehouse located ten miles 
away.
75
 Spraggins took a company vehicle intending to retrieve decor 
needed for hotel rooms at the warehouse.
76
 On her quest, Spraggins hit a 
guardrail on the Mortar Creek Bridge, crossed into oncoming traffic, and hit 
the vehicle containing Wilkes and Russell in a head-on collision.
77
  
The bridge is eight miles west of Wind Creek-Wetumpka gaming 
facility, is not on reservation lands, and is not en route to the warehouse 
where Spraggins picked up the lamp shades.
78
 The facts, however, are 
unclear as to where Spraggins went after picking up the lamps or how 
Spraggins ended up on the bridge where the collision occurred. Spraggins, 
intoxicated at the time of the collision, did not remember why she was on 
                                                                                                             
 67. Id. at *1. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
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the Mortar Creek Bridge.
79
 When tested an hour and forty-five minutes 
after the crash, she had a blood-alcohol content of .293, significantly higher 
than the .08 legal limit.
80
  
Following the collision, Wilkes and Russell brought suit against 
Spraggins and the Poarch Band of Creek Indians as her employer.
81
 Wilkes 
and Russell alleged negligence and wantonness claims against both named 
defendants.
82
 The claims against the Tribe were based on the fact that 





Wilkes and Russell filed suit against Spraggins and the Poarch Band of 
Creek Indians in the Elmore County Circuit Court in Alabama on February 
16, 2015.
84
 Wilkes and Russell’s amended complaint “asserted negligence 
and wantonness claims” against Spraggins and the Tribe based on her 
operation of the vehicle resulting in the accident, as well as negligence and 
wantonness claims against the Tribe for its “hiring retention and 
supervision of Spraggins.”
85
 Following discovery, the Tribe moved for 
summary judgment, arguing that (1) as a federally recognized tribe, the 
Poarch Band of Creek Indians was “protected by the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity”; or, in the alternative, (2) “Spraggins was not acting 
within the scope of her employment at the time of the January 2015 
accident.”
86
 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Tribe, 
finding an absence of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the Tribe’s 
sovereign immunity.
87
 After the trial court ruled for the Tribe, Wilkes and 
Russell appealed; the Supreme Court of Alabama then granted their 
appeal.
88
 The Supreme Court of Alabama’s sole issue to consider was 
whether “the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity shields tribal defendants 
from the tort claims asserted by Wilkes and Russell.”
89
 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at *2. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss2/6




The Supreme Court of Alabama reached its decision—the Poarch Band 
of Creek Indians was not protected by common law sovereign immunity—
relying on one primary avenue. The Alabama Supreme Court put forth an 
argument completely centered on footnote 8 of the majority opinion and the 
dissenting opinion put forth by Justice Thomas in Bay Mills. The footnote 
explains that the Supreme Court has yet to “specifically [address] . . . 
whether immunity should apply in the ordinary way if a tort victim, or other 
plaintiff who has not chosen to deal with a tribe has no alternative way to 
obtain relief for off-reservation commercial conduct.”
90
 The Alabama 
Supreme Court believed that this case, involving Wilkes and Russell suing 
a tribal defendant for a tort action, fell under the footnote’s proposed 
scenario.
91
 Thus, the Alabama court took the footnote as providing the 
means to disagree with established precedent. The argument advanced by 
the Alabama Supreme Court is unsatisfactory. The argument lays an 
insufficient foundation to overturn a common law doctrine which has been 
developed by courts for over a century. 
A. Foundation of Respondents’ Stance 
As explored above, Supreme Court precedent and the common law 
doctrine of sovereign immunity have remained virtually unscathed. While 
many cases reaffirm the notion of tribal immunity, Kiowa and Bay Mills are 
the two most prominent in setting forth the appropriate foundation. The two 
cases depict how common law sovereign immunity is viewed through the 
eyes of both Congress and the Supreme Court. While the two cases were 
brought in the context of contract claims, the Court made it clear that tribal 
sovereign immunity does not just apply to contract cases. Rather, immunity 
applies to any case involving tribal sovereigns. However, while the two 
cases gave what the Supreme Court—depicted in its majority holding in 
Bay Mills—believed to be absolute tribal sovereign immunity, the Alabama 
Supreme Court addressed a valid point: what happens when tribal sovereign 
immunity is “contrary to the interests of justice, especially inasmuch as the 
tort victims in this case” had no alleged “opportunity to negotiate with the 
tribal defendants for a waiver of immunity”?
92
  
With this in mind, relying on the content in footnote 8 and the Alabama 
Supreme Court decision, Respondents Wilkes and Russell advance several 
                                                                                                             
 90. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 799 n.8 (2014). 
 91. Wilkes, 2017 WL 4385738, at *4. 
 92. Id. at *4. 
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arguments speaking to why they believe the Alabama Supreme Court’s 
reasoning is correct. Foremost, Respondents argue the Alabama court did 
not stray from authority, seeing as the Supreme Court has never directly 
addressed tort immunity when the non-tribal party had not chosen to 
interact with the tribe.
93
 Thus, Respondents argue the Alabama court 
decision is consistent with the Supreme Court’s previous holdings.
94
  
Further, Respondents draw on the idea that the decisions advanced in 
Kiowa and Bay Mills are solely focused on the context of contracts, 
implying that the common law doctrine of tribal immunity does not protect 
tribes from other types of suits.
95
 Referencing the Court’s clear call for 
congressional intervention following Kiowa, and the subsequent legislation 
considered by Congress, Respondents focus on Congress’s “decision to 
retain that form of tribal immunity.”
96
 Concluding this prong of their 
defense, Respondents argue that a tribe holds a “panoply of tools . . . to 
enforce its law on its own lands.”
97
 In essence, Respondents see the 
Alabama Supreme Court’s decision as falling squarely within the scope of 
tribal immunity. They argue that the Poarch Band of Creek Indians’ 
arguments are centered on broad immunity, ignoring footnote 8 and the 
discussion surrounding it in the Bay Mills dissent.
98
 
In their brief opposing certiorari review, Respondents also argue that 
“[t]here is no historical justification for applying tribal sovereign immunity 
to off-reservation torts.”
99
 Wilkes and Russell claim the reasoning behind 
this idea stems from a line in Kiowa, which describes common law tribal 
sovereign immunity as developing almost by accident.
100
 However, this 
point need not be addressed because it is created from cobbled bits of 




As to Respondents’ claim that off-reservation torts are not covered by 
tribal sovereign immunity, they once again rely on Justice Thomas’s dissent 
in Bay Mills. Quoting the dissent, Respondents write, “Expanding tribal 
                                                                                                             
 93. Id. at *3.  
 94. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 6, Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. 
Wilkes, No. 17-1175 (U.S. June 8, 2018), https://sct.narf.org/documents/poarch_v_wilkes/ 
cert_opposition.pdf [hereinafter Brief for the Respondents].  
 95. Id.  
 96. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 801 (2014). 
 97. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 94, at 7.  
 98. Id. at 7–8. 
 99. Id. at 8. 
 100. Id. (citing Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998)). 
 101. Id. at 8–9.  
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immunity to off-reservation activity is not only ‘unsupported by any 
rationale for that doctrine’ but also ‘inconsistent with the limits on tribal 
sovereignty.’”
102
 This argument is erroneous. As stated previously, the 
Supreme Court has definitively ruled that tribal sovereign immunity, unless 
Congress says otherwise, is unequivocal in its authority.
103
  
The last leg of Respondents’ argument is focused on the immunity of 
tribes versus other sovereigns. They believe “[p]ermitting tribes to assert 
immunity for off-reservation torts would be particularly anomalous because 
it would vest tribes with a form of immunity enjoyed by no other 
sovereign.”
104
 Respondents argue that if Spraggins were employed by 
another sovereign, such as a state or foreign nation, they would not fall 
under sovereign immunities’ umbrella of protection.
105
 This statement hits 
at the very core of what sovereign immunity means to tribes. Tribes enjoy 
that level of immunity because they are domestic dependent nations. Thus, 
like states, but unlike foreign nations, tribes fall under congressional 
authority; conversely, like foreign entities, but unlike states, tribes are 
sovereign nations. This combination creates a level of sovereignty unlike 
any other, which is why tribal immunity is completely unique. As Justice 
Kagan said in the Bay Mills opinion, tribes are separate sovereigns, and 
they are sovereigns that pre-exist the Constitution.
106
 Arguing that they 
enjoy immunity unlike that of a state or a foreign nation goes to the very 
core of the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Furthermore, this 
argument does not stand alone because Bay Mills made it unequivocally 
clear that tribes enjoy sovereign immunity unless or until Congress 
abrogates that protection. Since Congress has yet to do so, tribal sovereign 
immunity stands. 
B. Finding the Correct Interpretation of Footnote 8 
Respondents did not want this case to be taken up on certiorari because, 
as discussed more thoroughly below, precedent is against them. This is 
illustrated by the holdings of the Supreme Court, at least three circuit courts 
(the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh), and several state supreme courts.
107
 
                                                                                                             
 102. Id. at 11 (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 813 (2014)). 
 103. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 790.  
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Instead, Respondents want the Supreme Court to allow lower courts to 
“reconsider their positions,” most of which rule in favor of tribal sovereign 
immunity.
108
 Wilkes and Russell believe the Supreme Court would “benefit 
from allowing the issue to percolate further in the lower courts before it 
intervenes to elaborate on Bay Mills.”
109
 The implications of this assertion 
are dangerous; this opens the door of dissention between the courts, 
potentially resulting in negative ramifications for tribes everywhere.  
Respondents’ argument struggles for many reasons, all of which boil 
down to a misrepresentation of footnote 8. Respondents set out to show that 
footnote 8 is a call to action—a statement granting lower courts permission 
to go against precedent. This argument is built on sand, as footnote 8 lacks 
any precedential force. As it reads, footnote 8 in Bay Mills is merely a 
comment on scenarios the Supreme Court has not addressed. At its core, 
however, footnote 8 is a reinforcement of the Court’s decisions in Kiowa 
and Bay Mills. The comment put forward by Justice Thomas speaks to the 
broad sovereign immunity the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of time and 
time again. Respondents’ characterization pits one footnote against more 
than one hundred years of federal Indian law.  
As stated previously, footnote 8 states that the Supreme Court has yet to 
address if immunity applies in the “ordinary way” when a tort victim or 
individual who has not willingly entered into a relationship with the tribe 
“has no alternative way” to acquire relief from “off-reservation commercial 
conduct.”
110
 Respondents’ footnote 8 argument first fails because they 
assert that they have no alternative way to obtain relief. This assumption 
ignores the potential of possible relief from suing Spraggins alone, thus 
avoiding the Tribe and the issue of sovereign immunity completely. 
Nonetheless, Respondents argue that applying immunity would leave 
Wilkes and Russell “without a remedy” for the wrongs allegedly committed 
by the Tribe.
111
 The inability to sue the Tribe does not take away from the 
possibility of full recovery. Respondents, hyper-focused as they are on the 
tort claim against the Tribe, overlook two crucial points. First, sovereign 
immunity, absent waiver or congressional intervention, provides full 
protection from suit. While Respondents argue that immunity should be 
                                                                                                             
421 (Ariz. 1968); Beecher v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians of Conn., 918 A.2d 880 (Conn. 
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abrogated in this case, under the scenario described in footnote 8, they are 
actually arguing for a full upheaval of tribal immunity. If limited in the way 
Respondents argue it should be, tribal immunity becomes more akin to 
conditioned liability than any real form of sovereignty. Naturally, this goes 
against precedent and the basic premise that tribes are domestic, sovereign 
nations.  
Second, their argument fails to acknowledge that the inability to gain 
recovery from the Tribe is part of the privilege held by tribes as sovereigns. 
After all, any application of the concept of immunity will leave the 
opposing party without a remedy. However, this does not mean that 
Respondents are remediless, only that they cannot recover from the Tribe. 
In this case, Respondents have the potential, although they ignore it, to “be 
made completely whole” by filing a suit against Spraggins herself.
112
 This 
illuminates the fact that this case is not the scenario described in footnote 8. 
Footnote 8 theorizes a case where the injured party is left without a remedy. 
Thus, because full recovery is available to Respondents via Spraggins, there 
is “no need to sue the Tribe to right the wrong [alleged].”
113
 
The notion that Respondents could fully recover from the accident by 
suing Spraggins is reinforced by Lewis v. Clarke,
114
 a case the Supreme 
Court addressed in 2016. This case involved a tort claim occurring off-
reservation.
115
 A tribal employee, in the course of his work, crashed into 
Lewis, an individual with no relationship with the Tribe.
116
 Lewis sued 
Clarke in his individual capacity.
117
 On certiorari, the Court considered 
whether or not tribal sovereign immunity protects an employee from 
individual capacity damages from torts committed within their scope of 
employment.
118
 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lewis, observing that 
the tort action was against the employee, not the Tribe itself.
119
 Therefore, 
since the party in interest was Clarke, acting in an individual capacity, tribal 
sovereign immunity is not implicated.
120
 It is crucial to note the parallels 
between this case and Wilkes. Foremost, Lewis sounded in tort for off-
                                                                                                             
 112. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 3, Poarch Band of Creek Indians v. Wilkes, No. 17-
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reservation conduct, which according to Respondent’s reading of footnote 
8, would mean that sovereign immunity should have been overturned. Yet, 
once again, the Court recognized that tribal sovereign immunity stands. 
Moreover, this is the perfect example of a case in which the plaintiffs were 
able to reach a remedy without suing the tribe in question. This further 
reinforces the fact that Respondents could be made whole without suing the 
Poarch Band of Creek Indians. 
Respondents’ argument regarding footnote 8 also fails because they are 
suing for conduct that occurred both off and on the reservation, while the 
footnote only speaks to “off-reservation commercial conduct.”
121
 One of the 
allegations against Petitioner is for “negligent and wanton hiring, retention, 
and supervision of Spraggins.”
122
 Alabama law dictates that a claim arises 
at “the location of the wrongful acts or omissions.”
123
 Thus, under Alabama 
law, the alleged negligent actions occurred on the reservation. This clearly 
falls outside of footnote 8’s “off-reservation commercial conduct” ambit.
124
 
In ruling for Respondents, the Alabama Supreme Court reached its holding 
without considering precedent, hinging its rationale solely on footnote 8, 
coincidentally going even further than Respondents’ suggestion. If the 
Alabama court followed Respondents’ interpretation of footnote 8 exactly, 
it would have ruled in favor of Respondents and against the Tribe because 
Spraggins was an employee of the Tribe who was arguably in the course of 
her work when the accident happened. The Alabama Supreme Court, 
however, went beyond Respondents’ claim and decided tribes are liable for 
torts off or on the reservation. This opens up the Tribe to liability in any tort 
case, regardless of where it happens, effectively destroying tribal 
sovereignty.  
Further, setting the Supreme Court holdings in Kiowa and Bay Mills 
aside, footnote 8 itself reinforces the common law doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity. As Petitioners state in their reply brief to Respondents, 
the footnote “says nothing about how courts should address that situation in 
the future, nor does it even hint that immunity would not be available under 
the Court’s existing precedent.”
125
 The Court, throughout the opinion and 
within footnote 8, explains with emphasis that any deviation away from 
precedent requires special justification.
126
 In short, the Court and Congress 
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have examined sovereign immunity from all sides, yet, they have 
maintained that tribes hold immunity without caveats. Thus, footnote 8 in 
Bay Mills mandates that broad immunity should be given to tribes under the 
common law doctrine, even in a scenario involving an off-reservation tort 
“where the claimant has no other remedy.”
127
 This further dispels any 
arguments that the Court’s decisions in Kiowa and Bay Mills only apply to 
contracts cases. The footnote, thus, presents no reason to go against 
precedent, nor does it support Respondents’ proposed argument that lower 
courts should be given more time to consider how they want to rule in the 
context of off-reservation torts. This Court has routinely dismissed suits 
against tribes, absent congressional authorization or waiver, making it 




Apart from their arguments regarding footnote 8, Respondents Wilkes 
and Russell fail to adequately address how circuit courts and state supreme 
courts have dealt with similar issues involving tribal defendants, either 
before or after the Court’s decision in Bay Mills. While Respondents argue 
that the Court should not grant review, in the guise of allowing lower courts 
further opportunity to reach their own decisions in similar scenarios, 
Respondents leave out that many courts have ruled on these issues—the 
majority of which have ruled in favor of tribal sovereign immunity.  
Petitioners point out the decision in Bay Mills has yet to result in any 
significant departure from adhering to precedential application of tribal 
sovereignty.
129
 Petitioners reference two cases in support of their 
proposition: (1) the Ninth Circuit decision of Arizona v. Tohono O’odham 
Nation
130
 and (2) the Utah Supreme Court decision of Harvey v. Ute Indian 
Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation.
131
 Both of these cases serve as 
examples of courts applying immunity “to tort claims asserted by non-
members.”
132
 These cases combat Respondents’ argument that “none of the 
courts considered the issues raised by [the Bay Mills] decision.”
133
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Respondents argue the Ninth Circuit in Tohono O’odham rejected an 
argument based on footnote 8 and instead adhered “to prior Ninth Circuit 
holding[s] that tribal sovereign immunity bars tort claims.”
134
 However, 
regarding footnote 8, Tohono O’odham actually referenced the Supreme 
Court’s discussion of stare decisis and, thus, declined “to depart from Ninth 
Circuit precedent.”
135
 Even more recently, the Tenth Circuit ruled in favor 
of tribal sovereign immunity in a slip and fall case where the accident 
occurred at a tribal gaming center.
136
 The Tenth Circuit emphasized that 
state courts do not have jurisdiction over such matters, as tribes are 
protected by their immune status.
137
  
Another issue seen in Respondents’ reply to the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari is how they minimize the Alabama Supreme Court’s holding. 
The Alabama court held that “the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity 
affords no protection to tribes with regard to tort claims asserted against 
them by non-tribe members.”
138
 Two critical points come from this: (1) the 
Alabama court asserts tribes are liable for torts off and on the reservation; 
and (2) the court does not limit liability to individuals who have no standing 
relationship with the tribe, meaning the tribe can be sued by an entity it is 
associated with. This ruling far exceeds the scope of footnote 8 in Bay 
Mills, which speaks only to a scenario involving an off-reservation tort 
where an individual has no relation to the tribe. However, Respondents 
taper the state court holding to fit into footnote 8, arguing for claims by 
individuals without a “personal or commercial relationship” to the tribe 
when they are harmed by off-reservation conduct.
139
 While this narrowing 
fits closer to the scenario described in footnote 8, it is a misrepresentation 
of the court’s decision, and, therefore, does not represent the potential 
ramifications of the Alabama court decision.  
Further, as Petitioners point out, “Even focusing on off-reservation 
torts[,] . . . there remains a split. Many of the state supreme court and 
federal court of appeals decisions . . . involved off-reservation torts. These 
include (at least) the Ninth Circuit[] . . . [and] the Eleventh Circuit[],” as 
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In essence, regardless of how the issue is framed, this case presents a 
pressing and frequent issue among lower courts, reinforcing the need for 
intervention. 
C. Impending Policy Issues 
From a policy perspective, the Supreme Court’s decision not to grant 
certiorari is unsettling, as Wilkes is an incorrect application of tribal 
sovereign immunity. Ramifications from the Alabama decision have the 
potential to interfere with tribal systems across the country. Further, this 
case provided the perfect vehicle to reaffirm Supreme Court precedent in 
favor of tribal sovereignty, specifically in reference to off-reservation torts. 
Despite their denial, and the ramifications which may follow it, the Court 
has been explicit when it comes to tribal sovereign immunity: it stands until 
Congress says otherwise. 
Alabama cannot rewrite federal Indian law even if equitable 
considerations make circumventing tribal sovereign immunity attractive. 
While lower courts across the country have upheld tribal sovereignty in 
similar scenarios, denying this case on certiorari review voices the Court’s 
apathy toward a critical tenant of tribal sovereignty. As this case was not 
overturned, some courts will likely use Alabama’s decision as a pillar of 
strength to flout federal precedent. Although the Supreme Court has been 
very precise in its application of tribal sovereign immunity, reinforcing 
precedent on many occasions, “state courts often apply that precedent only 
reluctantly–even with disdain.”
141
 There is an understandable fear that, 
because this decision stands, a recurrence of “historic patterns of disregard 
for Tribal Nations and their sovereign status” will develop.
142
 If so, the 
result would be a storm of dangerous decisions—decisions that could lead 
to the downfall of tribal governance altogether. There is potential that tribes 
could cease to be the “domestic dependent nations” they were recognized as 
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 This clearly goes against established precedent, which 
recognizes sovereignty as a “necessary corollary to Indian sovereignty and 
self-governance” that lies at the heart of tribal sovereign immunity.
144
 
On another front, allowing the disembodiment of tribal sovereignty can 
create tangible challenges for tribes. Petitioners highlight that “exposing 
tribes to tort suits could ‘impose serious financial burdens’ on already 
‘financially disadvantaged’ tribes.”
145
 Although some tribes have had 
widely publicized financial success, most tribes “still [struggle] 
economically.”
146
 In Bay Mills, Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion 
illustrates that while public sentiment might argue if tribes are engaged in 
“highly lucrative commercial activity” such as gaming, they can afford suit, 
the reality is that such gaming income is monopolized by only a few tribes, 
with “[n]early half of federally recognized Tribes . . . not operat[ing] 
gaming facilities at all.”
147
 Thus, one of the tangible fears is that opening 
tribes up to suits such as this will cause great financial burdens and threaten 
their ability to survive. After all, tribes, unlike states, depend on their 
sovereign status because they do not receive tax-based revenue.
148
  
Further, tribal sovereignty is an issue that continually resurfaces in 
litigation. The Supreme Court’s docket has seen a multitude of tribal 
sovereignty cases in the last forty years.
149
 Although deciding against the 
Alabama court would not stop future misapplications of Indian law, it is 
nearly certain that, as it has gone unaddressed, this scenario will emerge 
more voraciously than ever before. This will create a massive strain on 
tribes, regardless of their financial stability, and hinder the court system 
and, thus, the mission behind following judicial precedent. Perhaps most 
frustrating about the Court’s denial of certiorari is the fact that Wilkes is an 
“ideal vehicle” to address the issue of tribal sovereignty in reference to off-
reservation torts.
150
 The question of tribal immunity in Wilkes is “squarely 
raised, fully briefed, and resolved in opinions” with “the resolution of that 
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question [being] dispositive” in the circuit court and the Alabama Supreme 
Court.
151
 Therefore, for all of the reasons stated—from the multiple issues 
presented by the Respondents’ footnote 8 argument, to the fact that this 
case provides the perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to cleanly rule 
on this issue of tribal immunity—Wilkes should have been taken up on 
certiorari. Nevertheless, it was not. If nothing else, the Supreme Court’s 
choice to allow the decision to stand will send a call to action—more clear 
than ever before—to Congress. Afterall, the duty of defining the scope of 
tribal sovereign immunity falls directly at their feet. 
V. Conclusion 
The Alabama Supreme Court in Wilkes erred in overturning the 
longstanding common law doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. The 
United States Supreme Court and Congress have been abundantly clear that 
tribal sovereign immunity is solid, regardless of the type of case at issue. 
Allowing the Alabama Supreme Court’s decision to stand will cause chaos 
in lower courts, result in untold amounts of ill-earned damages, and chip 
away at the hard-earned foundation created for tribes over the past century. 
Although the Supreme Court has historically made sound decisions 
regarding tribal sovereign immunity, denying certiorari here was a misstep. 
The days ahead are unclear for tribes, but hope remains that the Court’s 
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